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Abstract 
This paper studies the policy implications of habits and cyclical changes in agents' appetite 
for risk-taking. To do so, it analyses the non-linear solution of a New Keynesian (NK) model, 
in which slow-moving habits help match the cyclical properties of risk-premia. Our findings 
suggest that the presence of habits and swings in risk appetite can materially affect policy 
prescriptions. As in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), a counter-cyclical fiscal instrument can 
eliminate habit-related externalities. Alternatively, monetary policy can partially curb the 
associated overconsumption by responding to risk premia. Specifically, periods in which risk 
premia are elevated (compressed) merit a looser (tighter) policy stance. However, the 
associated welfare gains appear quantitatively small. 
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1. Introduction
Over the past decade, New Keynesian (NK) models have become one of the
most popular tools used for policy analysis. They were seen to epitomise the
consensus – broadly shared by policy makers and academics – that central banks
should set nominal interest rates in order to control aggregate demand and achieve
stable prices.1 The recent financial crisis, however, has reopened the debate on
the optimal conduct of monetary policy, and has led many economists to revisit
the key assumptions on which the “inflation targeting” paradigm was founded.2
Disruptions in asset markets during the crisis motivated many modifications
of the benchmark model used for policy analysis. The approach in a number of
studies was to increment the original New Keynesian model to explicitly include
financial frictions (see, for example, Curdia and Woodford (2010), Christiano,
Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), Rabanal, Kannan, and Scott (2009), Sgherri
and Gruss (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)).
While these analyses are undoubtedly of interest, and arguably of crucial im-
portance, we believe that the recent events were heavily influenced by swings
in investors’ risk appetite (e.g. the high, pre-crisis levels of risk taking and the
subsequent hike in risk aversion and risk premia). Accordingly, this is the feature
that we give prominence to in our analysis.3
To generate swings in risk aversion, we deviate from the benchmark New Key-
1Woodford (2003) is an established reference.
2See also Rabanal (2011) for a concise discussion.
3We should note that our model does not feature financial crises or disruptions in asset
markets, but only incorporates booms and busts (or cyclical swings) in agent’s appetite for risk.
Arguably, recently proposed models of the crisis (e.g. the leverage cycle model of Geanakoplos
(2009)) can endogenously generate similar swings in aggregate risk aversion (e.g. via exit /
bankruptcy of optimistic investors in bust periods). If this line of research was to be developed
further, one would be able to make a more direct link between general economic developments
and asset market features.
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nesian model by allowing for persistent external habits in consumption. Different
types of habits (internal, external, in ratios or differences) have long been present
in the monetary and macro literatures (e.g. Muellbauer (1988), Abel (1990),
Constantinides (1990), Gali (1994), Heaton (1995), Alessie and Lusardi (1997))
with the seminal contributions of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2007) helping solidify their place in applied macroeconomic
modelling.4,5 Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) discussed the implications of habits
for fiscal policy, while Fuhrer (2000a,b) and Amato and Laubach (2004) stud-
ied monetary-policy implications of internal habits. Dennis (2003), however, in
the context of a model in which the monetary authority follows optimal discre-
tionary policy, documented that the dynamics implied by internal and external
habits significantly differ and argued in favour of the latter specification. Other
important contributions include Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse (2008), who de-
rived optimal monetary rules in the case of external, non-persistent habits, and
Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) who went on to study the case of “deep”
habits.6
The asset pricing literature incorporating persistent habits preceded and par-
tially motivated some of the macro and monetary studies. There, Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) (CC hereafter) have shown that slow-moving external habits
can generate time-varying risk aversion and can play a key role in accounting for
the dynamic properties of the equity risk premium. Related setups – in which the
entire history of aggregate consumption determines current habit levels – proved
4Historically, first references to habits can be traced as far back as Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics (350BC) and in the economics literature to Smith (1776) and Pigou (1903).
5Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Uhlig (2007) demonstrate, however, that simply
assuming habits in a production economy does little to generate plausible asset price dynamics
as agents have many opportunities of smoothing consumption risks.
6The term “deep habits” stands for the case in which consumers form habits at the level of
individual goods rather than at the level of an aggregate consumption basket.
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instrumental in generating a high equity premium or matching expected stock
return volatility (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Tallarini
and Zhang, 2005; Abel, 2006) and were used in the foreign exchange literature
(Verdelhan, 2006; De Paoli and Sondergaard, 2009) as well as yield-curve studies
(Wachter, 2006; Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin, 2009). In those con-
tributions habits introduced swings in risk appetite into agents’ behaviour and
allowed their strength to affect risk premia (and thus asset prices).
One general conclusion from the macro and monetary studies referred to above
is that external habits lead to consumption which is in excess of socially optimal
levels. This occurs because individual agents fail to internalise the negative im-
plications of their spending decisions on the welfare others, and it implies that
optimal policy should aim to mitigate overconsumption. The broad question that
we seek to address in this paper is how can this be practically achieved? More
specifically, given of the success of persistent habit specifications in generating
realistic asset price dynamics, and given the on-going policy debate, we analyse
policies that directly respond to asset prices. Our analysis builds on De Paoli
and Zabczyk (2012a) (DPZ hereafter) who showed that slow-moving, external
consumption habits justify tighter monetary policy following productivity shocks
and may, under sufficient degrees of habit persistence, flip the optimal response
from a policy loosening to a tightening. In the present paper we study whether
one can formulate policies – both monetary and fiscal – which, by responding to
asset prices, curb overconsumption and increase social welfare.7
To shed light on the issue, we proceed in several steps. Firstly, we derive
a micro-founded quadratic loss function. We do so in order to obtain the “tra-
ditional” representation of welfare losses. Crucially, the effect of habits on risk
7Contrary to De Paoli and Zabczyk (2012a) we do not study monetary policy based on the
unobservable natural rate.
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aversion implies that one cannot write that loss function solely in terms of the
output gap and inflation. We show that social losses also depend on the volatility
of the stochastic discount factor, which induces agents to save for precautionary
reasons and determines the size of risk premia.
As an alternative to monetary policy, we propose a fiscal instrument that
can offset the externality introduced by habits.8 We show that it is optimal to
tax consumption in periods of low risk aversion and high asset prices. For the
special case in which habits are not persistent, we also show that the efficient
allocation can be achieved with the use of three policy tools: the aforementioned
state-contingent consumption tax, monetary policy that stabilises inflation and
a steady state labour subsidy/tax that offsets firms’ monopoly power.
In the general case of persistent habits, we obtain results in terms of a fiscal
rule that responds to asset prices and find that it is optimal to increase con-
sumption taxes in periods of high equity prices. We then focus specifically on
the design of simple interest rate rules, with the aim of coming up with policy
prescriptions that can be easily implemented by central banks. We use this ex-
ercise to examine whether policy should counteract falls in risk premia and find
that indeed the optimal simple interest rule has a negative coefficient on the risk
premium. But our findings show that when compared with a monetary policy
rule that responds to risk premia, a fiscal policy rule which responds to equity
prices is a more effective tool in reducing welfare losses coming from the habit
externality.
8The idea that a tax instrument should curb overconsumption in models with external habits
is in line with the findings Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), who characterise an optimal income
tax instrument.
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2. Model
As noted above, our baseline model is a version of the one proposed in De
Paoli and Zabczyk (2012a) and entails a New Keynesian core augmented with
slow-moving consumption habits. In the remainder of this section we present
the derivations of the dynamic model equations, referring to the appendix for
steady-state computations.
2.1. Households
The economy is inhabited by a large number of households, indexed by a. All
of them have identical preferences defined over the consumption of a composite
good C, and leisure L
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiU (Ct+i (a) , Lt+i (a))
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor measuring impatience. Time
available for work (denoted by N) and leisure is normalised to one, so that
Lt+i (a) = 1−Nt+i (a) .
The period utility function is given by
U (C,L) ≡ (C − hX)
1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
(N)1+η − 1
1 + η
where X represents an external consumption habit which is assumed to depend
on aggregate consumption as
Xt = φXt−1 + (1− φ)Ct−1. (1)
Households’ period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Ct (a) +
Vt
Pt
Bnt (a) + V
r
t B
r
t (a) + V
eq
t St (a)
=
Wt
Pt
Nt (a) +
1
Pt
Bnt−1 (a) +B
r
t−1 (a) + (V
eq
t +Dt)St−1 (a) . (2)
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On the right-hand side, we have labour income and current values of financial
assets held over from the previous period. During the discrete period, households
supply N units of labour, which is remunerated at the nominal market wage
W . We shall posit complete markets but include in the budget constraint those
assets, whose prices will help us define the returns referred to subsequently. Those
assets include a one-period, zero-coupon nominal bond Bn with a face value of
a unit of money, a one-period, zero-coupon real bond Br which pays a unit of
consumption at maturity, and a share in a real equity index, which is a claim on
a portion of all firms’ profits, S. We shall adopt the convention that prices of real
assets are real (i.e. denominated in units of the consumption good), while prices
of nominal assets will be denominated in units of money. We denote the prices
of real and nominal bonds by V r and V n respectively, while the (real) price of
the equity share paying (real) dividends D is denoted by V eq. The left-hand side
of the budget constraint (2) captures expenditures on consumption C, and on a
new portfolio of assets.
Household a’s choice variables are consumption C (a); labour supply N (a);
as well as bond and equity holdings Br (a) , Bn (a) and S (a) respectively. The
assumption of complete asset markets and focus on a symmetric equilibrium
eliminate all aggregation related issues and allow us to replace individual choice
variables (a) with economy wide averages (or aggregates, as the mass of house-
holds equals 1). In this symmetric equilibrium all bonds are in zero net supply
Br = Bn = 0 and equity prices have to be such that households choose to own
the entire stock of equity S = 1. Defining the gross inflation rate as Πt ≡ PtPt−1
and the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint Λt, the aggregate first order
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conditions can be written as
(Ct − hXt)−ρ = Λt (3)
Nηt = Λt
Wt
Pt
(4)
ΛtV
n
t = Et
[
β
Λt+1
Πt+1
]
(5)
ΛtV
r
t = Et [βΛt+1] (6)
ΛtV
eq
t = Et
[
βΛt+1
(
V eqt+1 +Dt+1
)]
(7)
Ct =
Wt
Pt
Nt +Dt (8)
where the expressions above are, respectively, those for marginal utility (3),
labour supply (4), asset prices (5) - (7) and the budget constraint (8). In what
follows we shall also refer to the nominal value of firms’ profits Qt defined as
Qt ≡ DtPt.
2.1.1. Asset pricing
For future reference, we can also define real and nominal bond returns as
Rnt+1 = (V
n
t )
−1 Rrt+1 = (V
r
t )
−1
with the one-period real holding returns on equity, Req given by
Reqt+1 =
V eqt+1 +Dt+1
V eqt
.
The equity risk premium (or simply “the risk premium” in the remainder), can
be then be defined as
rpt = Et(r
eq
t+1 − rrt )
where lower case variables denote log-deviations from steady state. Note that
defining the stochastic discount factor M , as Mt+1 ≡ βΛt+1/Λt allows us to
write the following log-normal approximation to the bond asset pricing equation
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(6)
rrt+1 = −Et [mt+1]−
1
2
vart (mt+1) . (9)
As elaborated in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or Verdelhan (2006), the vari-
ance term on the right-hand side can naturally be interpreted as capturing the
precautionary savings motive. An increase in the volatility of marginal utility
that increases agents’ willingness to engage in precautionary savings will there-
fore reduce the mean of the real interest rate.
2.2. Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate good
firms and a perfectly competitive final good sector, where the intermediate vari-
eties are “repackaged” into a single consumption bundle. Monopolistic competi-
tion in the intermediary sector allows us to have firms that are price-setters, and
this in turn facilitates the introduction of nominal rigidities a’la Calvo (1983).
2.2.1. The final goods sector
The final good Yt+i is produced by bundling together a range of intermediate
goods Yt+i (z) using the following Dixit-Stiglitz technology
Yt+i =
 1∫
0
(Yt+i (z))
σ−1
σ dz

σ
σ−1
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate inputs. Cost
minimisation implies the following demand for each individual variety
Yt+i (z) =
(
Pt+i (z)
Pt+i
)−σ
Yt+i, (10)
as well as an aggregate price index (equal to the price of the composite bundle)
given by
Pt =
 1∫
0
Pt (z)
1−σ dz

1
1−σ
where Pt (z) is the price of intermediate good z.
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2.2.2. Intermediate goods sector
There is a continuum of intermediate goods firms (indexed by z) that max-
imise profits, which are paid out as dividends to households holding shares. Fol-
lowing Calvo (1983), we assume that each period a fraction 1 − α of randomly-
selected firms can adjust their price P (z), while the remaining fraction α can
not. Firms maximise profits
maxEt
∞∑
i=0
αiβi
Ψt+i (z)
Ψt (z)
(Pt (z)Yt+i (z)−Wt+iNt+i (z)) (11)
where βiΨt+i (z) /Ψt (z) is the zth firm’s stochastic discount factor. Nominal
profits are the difference between revenue and expenditures on labour and ex-
pression (11) accounts for the fact that the price Pt (z) chosen in period t will
still be in effect in period t+i with probability αi. Firms face a downward-sloping
demand curve (10) and produce intermediate variety Y (z), using hired labour
according to the following technology
Yt+i (z) = A
η
η+1
t+i Nt+i (z) ,
9
where total factor productivity At+i is stochastic and follows an AR(1) process
of the form
log (At) =
(
1− ρA) log (A¯)+ ρA log (At−1) + εAt , εAt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2εA) . (12)
Firms optimise over labour input N (z) and the price of their good P (z). As
described in Walsh (2003), all firms adjusting prices in period t face the same
problem and will thus be choosing the same price. Letting P ∗t denote the optimal
price chosen by all firms which can reset, and exploiting the fact that firms are
owned by households (i.e. Ψt = Λt), the first order condition with respect to P
∗
9The production function has power η
η+1
on productivity A in order to be consistent with a
Yeoman-farmer version of the model.
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can be written as
P ∗t
Pt
=
(
σ
σ − 1
)
PBt
PAt
(13)
where the auxiliary variables PAt and PBt satisfy
PAt = Et
∞∑
i=0
αiβiΨt+i
(
Pt+i
Pt
)σ−1
Yt+i = ΨtYt + αβEt
[
PAt+1 (Πt+1)
σ−1
]
PBt = Et
∞∑
i=0
αiβiΨt+iΥt+i
(
Pt+i
Pt
)σ
Yt+i = ΨtΥtYt + αβEt [PBt+1 (Πt+1)
σ]
and where Υ (z) denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the market clearing condition.
Because the adjusting firms were selected randomly from the whole popula-
tion, therefore the average price used by firms that were not able to adjust will
equal the average price level in period t − 1. This implies that average prices
satisfy
P
1−σ
t = (1− α)P ∗
1−σ
t + αP
1−σ
t−1 . (14)
Finally, the first order condition with respect to Lt yields the following labour
demand equation
−Wt
Pt
+ ΥtA
η
η+1
t = 0. (15)
2.2.3. Aggregation
We start by combining firms’ production function Yt (z) = A
η
η+1
t+i Nt+i (z) with
the demand curve Yt (z) = (Pt (z) /Pt)
−σ Yt. Integrating these conditions and
defining the domestic price dispersion term as PDt ≡
1∫
0
(Pt (z) /Pt)
−σ dz and
aggregate labour supply as Nt ≡
1∫
0
Nt (z) dz, we can write
Yt =
A
η
η+1
t Nt
PDt
with the Calvo pricing rule implying that price dispersion evolves according to
PDt = (1− α)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−σ
+ α (Πt)
σ PDt−1. (16)
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Using Nt =
1∫
0
Nt (z) dz we can also write
Wt
Pt
= ΥtN
−1
t YtPDt (17)
with aggregation of profits leading to
Dt =
Qt
Pt
= Yt − Wt
Pt
Nt. (18)
2.3. Monetary policy
In order to close the model we need to make assumptions about central bank
behaviour. We will consider several alternatives:
• Under strict inflation targeting, the central bank keeps inflation pit equal to
zero at all times, thus replicating the flexible price allocation;
• As is standard, under money market equilibrium, the central bank can also
be assumed to set the nominal interest rate rcb = rn. In section 5.1 we
therefore analyse a variety of Taylor-type interest rate rules for rcb, the
coefficients of which will be chosen optimally.
2.4. Risk premium and precautionary savings: a special case
As discussed in Li (2001) and De Paoli and Zabczyk (2012b), the equity risk
premium can be written as
covt(c
e
t+1, r
r
t+1) = covt(ct+1, r
r
t+1) Et
Ct+1
Cet+1
(19)
where excess consumption is defined as Cet = Ct − hXt. Moreover, as studied in
De Paoli and Zabczyk (2012b), in the special case of flexible prices and inelastic
labour – i.e. η → ∞ (i.e. in an endowment model where ct = ρct−1 + εAt ) the
derivative of the risk premium rpt with respect to the current shock realisation
12
can be expressed as
∂rpt
∂εt
≈ EtS−2t+1C−1t+1h(1− φ)
[
Ct − ρ
t∑
s=0
φsCt−s
]
.10 (20)
From equation (19) it is clear that if habits are not persistent (φ = 0) then
the risk premium is counterfactually pro-cyclical. The study then proceeds to
analyse how persistence in habits and shocks is crucial to generate the observed
counter-cyclical movements in risk premia. Subsequently, DPZ demonstrate that
similar conditions will drive the cyclicality in precautionary savings. In particular,
the paper shows that in an endowment economy the variance of the stochastic
discount factor can be written as
vart(mt+1) = κ0 + κ1[(1− φ− ρ)ct + φxt]
where κ0 =
ρ2σ2ε
(1−h)2 , κ1 =
2hρ2σ2ε
(1−h)3 and σ
2
ε is the exogenous shock volatility. Given
that xt is a predetermined variable, the equation above proves that vart(mt+1)
is countercyclical (i.e. ∂vart(mt+1)∂ct > 0) as long as φ + ρ > 1.
11 Expressed alter-
natively, investors will demand relatively higher compensation for holding risky
assets if they expect future economic conditions to remain poor (consumption to
persistently undershoot its steady state). If, on the other hand, the expectation
is for an improvement in economic prospects, then negative shocks might (coun-
terfactually) not translate into higher risk premia and precautionary behaviour.
This occurs when habits are fast moving and consumption reverts back to mean
quickly, as investors faced with the bad shock quickly “adapt” to lower levels of
10This conditon holds if the conditional variance of returns vart(r
r
t+1) and their conditional
covariance with consumption covt(r
r
t+1, ct+1) are constant. Furthermore, it holds exactly under
the additional assumption that excess consumption and risky returns are jointly conditionally
log-normal and that consumption is also conditionally log-normal.
11This expression was derived using a second order approximation of the stochastic discount
factor.
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consumption while at the same time, the expectation is for the latter to recover.
This means that investors actually expect consumption to be far above its habit
level in the future and might therefore be more inclined to take on risk.
3. Welfare
Welfare losses in the model described in the previous section are driven by
different economic inefficiencies. The presence of nominal rigidities introduces
relative price distortions. Monopolistic competition implies that firms exert mar-
ket power and underproduce relative to the social optimum. And finally, external
habits lead to overconsumption, as households fail to internalise the effect of their
consumption choices on the economy-wide habit level.
We shall now derive a simple characterisation of social losses by computing
a second order approximation to the utility function. We note that while the
analytical formulae presented below rely on the steady state being efficient, our
numerical solution (presented in subsequent sections) does not require such as-
sumptions. Also, our numerical evaluation of welfare is not based on a second
order approximation. In fact, in order to take into account how cyclical swings
in risk aversion affect agents’ precautionary behaviour and asset prices, we ap-
proximate welfare and the model dynamics up to fourth order.12
As shown in the appendix, which follows Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009),
the conditional social loss derived from the utility Ut of the representative agent
can be written as
L0 =
1
2
κE0
∞∑
0
βt
[
1− h
1− kρ(c
e
t )
2 + η(y
′
t)
2 +
σ
κ
pi2t
]
+ tip+ o[2]13
12As discussed subsequently, this is required to correctly account for time-varying risk premia
and precautionary savings motives.
13As shown in the appendix, we define κ = 1−k
1−h
(
C
e)1−ρ
= N
1+η
.
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where y′t = yt − at, tip stands for terms independent of policies and o[2] denotes
terms of order higher than two.
Moreover, the unconditional social loss can be written as
L ≡ −E(Ut) = κ
2(1− β)
[
1− h
ρ(1− k)σ
2
m + ησ
2
y′ +
σ
κ
σ2pi
]
+ tip+ o[2].
Accordingly, social losses depend on the variance of inflation σ2pi ≡ var(pi), the
variance of an output gap measure σ2y′ ≡ var(y′) and the variance of the stochastic
discount factor σ2m ≡ var(m). As shown in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2012a) the
variance of the stochastic discount factor drives agents’ buffer stock savings and
by extension also risk premia. In other words, in a world with endogenous swings
in risk taking, economic uncertainty that instigates precautionary behaviour has
a direct effect on welfare.
We note that, in the absence of consumption habits, the unconditional loss
would be given by
1
2
κ
∞∑
0
[
(η + ρ)σ2ygap +
σ
κ
σ2pi
]
where ygapt = yt − ηρ+ηat = yt − yflext and yflext is the flexible price output allo-
cation, which coincides with efficient output. So, under the efficient steady state
assumption, stabilising inflation would automatically close the welfare-relevant
output gap and first-best could be achieved. But in a model with habits, the
consumption externality breaks this so-called “divine coincidence”.14
4. Economic efficiency: an auxiliary fiscal instrument
In this section, similarly to Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), we show how eco-
nomic efficiency can be restored – with the three aforementioned types of market
14The term “divine coincidence” was coined by Blanchard and Gali (2007) and corresponds
to the situation, in which stabilising inflation also closes the welfare-relevant output gap.
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imperfections still in place – using an appropriately designed mix of fiscal and
monetary policies (in subsequent sections we analyse how monetary policy alone
should be adjusted to tackle such dynamic inefficiencies). The misallocation com-
ing from external habits can be perhaps best understood by contrasting the first
order condition with respect to consumption under the competitive equilibrium –
equation (3) – with the one that arises in the planner’s problem when additionally
accounting for habit dynamics (equation (1)). As discussed in DPZ, and covered
in more detail in the appendix, if a benevolent social planner were to include the
economy-wide habit level (Xt) within her choice variables, then the first order
condition with respect to consumption would be given by
(C∗t − hX∗t )−ρ − Λ∗t − β(1− φ)EtΛxt+1 = 0 (21)
where Λxt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier on the equation specifying the evolution
of habits (1). Moreover, the first order condition with respect to Xt would be
−h (C∗t − hX∗t )−ρ + Λxt − βφEtΛxt+1 = 0. (22)
If we further assumed that prices are perfectly flexible and firms have no monopoly
power (or that polices are in place that result in such an allocation), then the
labour-leisure decision would simplify to
(C∗t )
η = Λ∗tA
η
η+1
t . (23)
Because in equilibrium Ct = Xt = Yt, therefore the equations above can be used
to characterise the efficient allocation of output (with “efficient” variables subse-
quently denoted using an asterisk). In particular, if we compare the competitive
equilibrium with the efficient allocation in steady state, we have
C
∗
C
= (1− k) 1ρ+η
(
σ
σ − 1
) 1
ρ+η
16
where the term k = β(1 − φ)h/(1 − βφ) is due to the presence of the habit
externality. Thus, whether the steady state levels of consumption and output are
inefficiently high or low depends on whether overconsumption induced by habits
outweighs the underproduction caused by monopolistic competition.
To offset the distortions caused by habits and monopolistic competition (both
the static ones above, as well as dynamic inefficiencies), we posit a consumption
tax Tt, which would enter households’ budget constraints as
TtPtCt (a) + VtBt (a)−WtNt (a)−Bt−1 (a)−Qt = 0.
This tax would appear in the first order condition with respect to consumption
as
(Ct − hXt)−ρ = TtΛt. (24)
The appendix derives the optimal tax rule for the special case, in which habits
are not persistent (φ = 0). This allows us to derive analytical expressions that
help highlight the economic intuition.15 As shown in the appendix, the tax rule
that restores efficiency can be written as
Tt =
1
1− hβM˜t
(
σ
σ − 1
)−1
(25)
where M˜t ≡ Et(Ct+1−hXt+1)
−ρ
(Ct−hXt+1)−ρ represents agents’ expectation of the grown rate of
their marginal utility. Under this rule, the competitive equilibrium would coincide
with the social planners one – i.e. the tax would eliminate the overconsumption
attributable to external habits. Analysing expression (25), we see that the fiscal
rule is forward looking and advocates higher taxes in periods, in which agents
expect conditions to improve.
Notably, and as discussed in Section 2.1.1, it is exactly this expectation of the
growth rate of marginal utility that drives movements in the risk premium and
15The corresponding intuition will subsequently be tested in the numerical part of our analysis,
where we relax the assumption of φ = 0.
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hence also equity prices. In particular, when agents expect conditions to improve
the risk premium is compressed and asset prices are higher. So, even though
the optimal tax given by equation (25) may not appear implementable – since
movements in marginal utilities are unobservable – responding to changes in asset
prices is arguably much more feasible. This will be examined more systematically
in the next section.
We also note that, in steady state, the optimal tax is larger than one (i.e. the
optimal fiscal tool is a tax and not a subsidy) if overconsumption generated by
habits (represented by the term 1/(1−hβ) in equation (25)) exceeds the steady-
state underproduction induced by monopolistic competition (represented by the
term σ/(σ − 1) in equation (25)).
Our finding suggests that fiscal policy should be utilised in periods of ex-
uberant expectations.16 The general idea that a tax instrument should curb
overconsumption in models with external habits is in line with the findings of
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), who characterise an optimal income tax instrument
(as opposed to consumption taxes analysed above). The insights coming from
such results may be useful for the growing literature on macroprudential pol-
icy, and the discussion of whether such policy should react to booms in asset
prices or compressions in risk premia. As discussed in Rabanal (2011), recent
research has suggested that it is possible to improve welfare by including asset
price fluctuations or indicators of financial vulnerability in the monetary policy
rule or, alternatively, that this should be the target of a macroprudential rule
(e.g. Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), Rabanal, Kannan, and Scott
(2009), Curdia and Woodford (2010), Sgherri and Gruss (2009)).
Figure 1 shows how the introduction of an efficient consumption tax affects
16The term “exuberant” here does not stand for mistaken expectation but only periods in
which economic conditions are expected to improve.
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Figure 1: Efficient and flexible price consumption profile following a one standard deviation
positive productivity shock (annualised, in percentage points)
the dynamics of consumption after a positive productivity shock.17 It demon-
strates that the optimal fiscal instrument partially offsets the effect of a boom in
productivity on consumption, arguably in order to restrain the effect of such con-
sumption increases on the average household’s habits. Note that the difference
between the efficient allocation and the flexible price equilibrium is more marked
when we relax the assumption of φ = 0 (the calibration used in this exercise
follows closely DPZ, with the parameter values listed in Table 1).
17In this exercise we maintain the assumptions that monetary policy stabilises prices, and
that there is a labour subsidy guaranteeing steady state efficiency. We also use a third order
perturbation approximation to the model’s solution, which is implemented in Dynare++.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
β 0.99
η 6
ρ 2.37
α 0.66
σ 10
h 0.85
φ 0.97 (unless stated otherwise)
γprod 0.997
sub (1−k)σσ−1 (unless stated otherwise)
σ∆c 0.75%
5. Optimal Simple Rules
Motivated by the previous discussion, which highlighted links between optimal
fiscal policy and asset price dynamics, we now explicitly focus on simple rules –
both fiscal and monetary – that attempt to move the equilibrium closer to first-
best by responding to asset prices.
5.1. Fiscal Rule
We begin by assuming that it is the fiscal authority that responds to conditions
in asset markets. More specifically, we consider the case in which consumption
taxes respond to equity prices according to
Tt = T¯ + θ
e(V eqt − V eq). (26)
As before, we initially assume that the monetary authority follows a strict infla-
tion targeting rule, which replicates the flexible price allocation. We then focus
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on finding values of the policy coefficient θe which maximise welfare. In the con-
text of our model, the natural measure of welfare W is given by the expected
discounted value of utility and satisfies the recursive definition
Wt ≡ Et
{(
Ct − hXt
)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
(Nt)
1+η − 1
1 + η
+ βWt+1
}
. (27)
There are several ways in which welfare can be approximated. The simplest
option would be to use the steady state level of welfare. Unfortunately, that
concept will not depend on policy and is thus unsuitable for our exercise. The
alternative, advocated in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) (who briefly discuss
related issues), is to compute the expected value of welfare conditional on being
in the steady state. Letting yt denote the state of the economy, our k-th order
perturbation approximation to the model solution gk(·, ·) satisfies
yt ≈ gk(yt−1, t) + o[k + 1]
and so, assuming welfare is the i-th coordinate of the state, the k-th order con-
ditional welfare measure Wk could be defined as
Wk ≡ gki (y¯, 0).
While Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) claim that this measure accounts for
transitional dynamics, which are important when evaluating welfare, it is not
immediately obvious why one should condition the transitional dynamics on the
deterministic steady state (which the authors note in passing in their analysis).18
Since, arguably, and as suggested by our numerical results, this choice of ini-
tial condition is likely to underplay the role of uncertainty and associated risk
corrections, we also consider two additional welfare measures. The first is the
18Notably, however, Villaverde et at (2010) argue that the concept may be well-suited for
capturing changes in welfare due to uncertainty.
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“stochastic fixed point” measure of welfare and the second is the unconditional
mean of welfare. The “stochastic fixed point” y˜ satisfies
y˜ = gk(y˜, 0)
i.e. it is the point in which the economy would remain if agents accounted for
risk in their decision rules, but if that risk never materialised (hence  = 0 in the
formula above). The k− th order stochastic fixed point measure of welfare would
thus be given by19
Wk,fp ≡ gki (y˜, 0).
And of course the unconditional mean Ey would satisfy
Ey = Egk(Ey, )
with the corresponding k − th order unconditional welfare measure given by20
Wk,unc. ≡ Egki (Ey, ).
As made clear in the definitions above, all those measures depend on the or-
der or approximation to the solution (i.e. k in the notation above). As argued
in DPZ, many of the risk-related / precautionary effects that we are interested
in capturing will only manifest themselves at third order. Accordingly, we eval-
uate the unconditional welfare measures based on simulations conducted using a
third order approximation. However, for the conditional welfare measure and the
19See also Kamenik (2007) for a discussion of the concept.
20In practice, we compute unconditional welfare using Monte Carlo methods and the model
solution generated by Dynare++. Specifically, for a given set of policy parameters we average
over 10K random draws taken from 2000 different simulations (we discard 85% of the sample to
eliminate the dependance on initial conditions). We have experimented by sampling over 500K
draws but since this appeared not to have any significant impact on the results, we settled on
the smaller sample.
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stochastic fixed point welfare measure (both of which can be computed directly
from the approximate solution, without resorting to simulation) it is possible to
show, in line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), that welfare estimates (both
conditional and based on the stochastic fixed point) do not change when moving
from second to third order.21 Accordingly, to capture the effects we are interested
in, we use the stochastic steady state based on a fourth order approximation to
the model’s solution.
The results of the exercise described above are presented in Table 2 (which,
for reference, also presents results based on a second order approximation).22 We
note that they have been obtained under the assumption that the optimal taxes
ensure that the steady-state is efficient. As alluded to previously, this leaves two
dynamic distortions in place. Since the central bank offsets that driven by nomi-
nal rigidities, therefore the fiscal rule will be left to tackle the one associated with
consumption habits. It follows that the optimal coefficient θe should be positive,
implying counter-cyclical fiscal policy via pro-cyclical consumption taxes. This is
also what our numerical simulations imply. In particular, when using the various
welfare measures we find values of θe∗ ranging from 0.4.to 2.0.23
21This is because all σ-corrections of an odd order are equal to zero for a symmetric shock
distribution like the Gaussian one that we use.
22In line with the discussion above, our results based on second order welfare approximations
do not take fully into account the effect of uncertainty on equilibrium dynamics – e.g. in this
case risk premia and agents’ precautionary motives are constant. So such analysis may represent
times of low uncertainty – or cases in which the linear approximation of the model (and a linear-
quadratic welfare measure) are not a bad approximation of reality. But clearly, even in this case,
habits will result in a time-varying aversion to risk and induce overconsumption.
23To find the maximum, we evaluate welfare on a grid (in line with SGU). We started by using
a grid of [-10,10] with a step of 0.05. Given that the maximum obtained using the conditional
welfare measure was always smaller than 2 in absolute value, we then restricted the grid to [-2,2]
retaining the step size. In previous versions of the paper we also directly maximised the welfare
measures, using a variety of optimisation routines. The conclusions from those exercises were
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To give an idea of the size of the welfare gains, Table 2 compares the value
of welfare under the optimised rule to that obtained when fiscal policy is passive
and only the static efficiency subsidies are in place. We find improvements in
social welfare ranging from 0.4% to 15%. Notably, and in line with the previous
discussion, the welfare gains obtained using measures not conditioned on the
deterministic steady state (i.e. arguably those in which risk plays an additional
role), point to greater benefits of active fiscal policies. Accordingly, to avoid
appearing to choose welfare measures which artificially inflate the importance of
our findings, and also to make it easier to compare our results to Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007), in the remainder we focus on the conditional welfare measure
based on a fourth order approximation (i.e. on W4).
Table 2: Optimal Simple Fiscal Rules
Welfare approximation θe∗ Welfare gain
(relative to θe = 0)
2nd order conditional welfare measure W2 0.4 0.4%
4th order conditional welfare measure W4 0.4 0.6%
2nd order stoch. fixed point welfare Wfp,2 2.0 9.2%
4th order stoch. fixed point welfare Wfp,4 1.05 5.7%
2nd order simulated welfare measure Wunc,2 1.9 7.2%
3rd order simulated welfare measure Wunc,3 2.0 14.2%
Table 3 presents some robustness analysis and examines how the results differ
under alternative specifications of the model (it is based on W4). Firstly, we
decrease the habit parameter (and set h = 0.7). The smaller habit parameter
reduces the strength of the habit externality. As a result, the optimal response to
asset prices decreases and so do the associated welfare gains. Similar results arise
when we decrease the persistence of habits. The table also shows that allowing
for an inefficient steady state does not change the optimal response to equity
in line with the ones we present here.
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prices but it does increase the welfare benefits from such responses.
Table 3: Optimal fiscal rule coefficients
θe∗ (4th order conditional welfare gain)
Benchmark 0.4 (0.6%)
Inefficient steady state 0.5 (1.0%)
h = 0.7 0.25 (0.2%)
φ = 0.7 0.35 (0.2%)
5.2. Monetary Rule
In this section we assume that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-type
rule that responds to inflation as well as asset prices. In particular, we consider
the case in which fiscal policy is passive and only ensures steady state efficiency
while monetary policy follows
rnt = θ
pipit + θ
rprpt. (28)
We first observe that equation (28) fails to include a familiar output gap term.
But, if one believes that monetary policy should not deal with steady state inef-
ficiencies – i.e. under an optimal steady state tax, when all economic distortions
come from habits and price dispersion – then the presence of inflation and a mea-
sure of risk taking might be sufficient. Aside from that, our exercise here has the
objective of considering rules which can be easily implemented, and so depend
only on “observables” – and it is debatable, whether the welfare-relevant output
gap falls into this variable category.
Based on a fourth order unconditional welfare ranking, we find that the op-
timal value of θpi and θrp are 20 and −0.4 respectively (in line with the intuition
developed in the analytical part of the paper). The result highlights that the
welfare cost associated with nominal rigidities tends to dominate the ones asso-
ciated with the habit externality. This is consistent with the results of Amato
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and Laubach (2004). Also, the welfare gains from a non-zero response to equity
prices appear very small.
Table 4: Optimal monetary rule coefficients (based on a 4th order conditional welfare measure)
θpi∗ θrp∗ Welfare gain
rnt = θ
pipit 20 NA NA
rnt = θ
pipit + θ
rp · rpt 20 −0.4 < 0.1%
rnt = θ
pipit + θ
rp · rpt (ineff. SS) 20 −0.2 < 0.1%
In summary, one may conclude that periods of high productivity, low risk
aversion and compressed risk premia would justify a contractionary bias in pol-
icy. Nevertheless, given that fluctuations in risk premia are only a “third order
phenomenon” – i.e. they only arise when approximating the model to third-order
– the inclusion of a policy response term plays a relatively minor role for welfare.24
6. Conclusion
The finance literature has taught us many things about factors driving asset
prices and risk premia. The recent financial crisis, in turn, has spurred mone-
tary economists to reinvestigate whether central banks should respond to these
financial variables or, more broadly, to asset market conditions. In this paper,
we tackled those policy questions using a model inspired by the asset-pricing lit-
erature. We showed how habits and the consequent swings in risk appetite affect
welfare and highlighted several ways in which movements in asset prices could be
incorporated in monetary and fiscal policy analysis.
Our framework was stylised and, accordingly, so was the characterisation of
policy. We also needed to resort to higher order approximations to even account
24As a check, we have also analysed the case of active monetary and fiscal policies. While
for parsimony we no longer report the results, those suggested small gains from accounting for
asset prices in a Taylor type rule. And, in line with the results from the previous section, they
pointed to significant gains from introducing another instrument to deal with distortions coming
from overconsumption.
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for fluctuations in risk taking behaviour. As such, using a model in which these
shifts in risk preferences are of first order importance may be a fruitful avenue
for future research (and may already by under way in a share of the literature
studying the role of “financial frictions”). In this paper, we also proposed a fiscal
instrument that could deal with so-called “overconsumption” externalities. Ex-
tending these results and relating them to the lively debate on macroprudential
instruments would thus seem like another clear avenue for future research. Ar-
guably, we also only considered the stylised case in which the fiscal and monetary
authorities fully cooperate when trying to optimally set their policies. Thus,
another interesting extension would be to assess an equilibrium in which the
authorities have different goals or simply set policy independently.
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APPENDIX - DERIVATIONS
Appendix A.1. The social loss function: A second order approximation
The utility function of the household is given by
Ut = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(Ct+i − hXt+i)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
(Nt+i)
1+η − 1
1 + η
]
and we can approximate each term in turn. Following Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi
(2009) and noting our more general specification of habits25, we have
(Ct+i − hXt+i)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ =(
C
e)1−ρ{ 1
1− h
[
ct +
1
2
c2t
]
− h 1
1− h
[
xt +
1
2
x2t
]
− 1
2
ρ(cet )
2
}
+ tip+ o[2].
But, given the definition of habits,
xt +
1
2
x2t = φ
[
xt−1 +
1
2
x2t−1
]
+ (1− φ)
[
ct−1 +
1
2
c2t−1
]
= (1− φ)
t∑
1
φs−1
[
ct−s +
1
2
c2t−s
]
.
Summing up to the future, we can write the utility of consumption as
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ct − hXt)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
=
(
C
e)1−ρ ∞∑
0
βt
{
1− k
1− h
[
ct +
1
2
c2t
]
− 1
2
ρ(cet )
2
}
+ tip+ o[2]
where k = β(1− φ)h/(1− βφ).
Our approximation of the disutility of labour is also based on Leith, Moldovan,
and Rossi (2009). However, noting that our specification of the production func-
tion implies that Yt = A
η
η+1
t Nt/PDt, we have
(Nt+i)
1+η − 1
1 + η
= N
1+η
[
yt +
1
2
(1 + η)(yt)
2 − ηytat + σ
2
var(pi)
]
+ tip+ o[2]
25The habit specification of Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) is a special case of the one
proposed in this paper in which φ = 0.
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and, thus, overall welfare can be written as
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ct − hXt)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
(Nt+i)
1+η − 1
1 + η
=
(
C
e)1−ρ ∞∑
0
βt
{
1− k
1− h
[
ct +
1
2
c2t
]
− 1
2
ρ(cet )
2
}
−N1+η
∞∑
0
βt
[
yt +
1
2
(1 + η)(yt)
2 − ηytat + σ
2
var(pi)
]
+ tip+ o[2]
From the steady state derivation we know that, if we assume an efficient subsidy,
we have
1− k
1− h
(
C
e)1−ρ
= N
1+η
= (1− h)
−ρ(η+1)
ρ+η (1− k) 1+ηρ+η .
Defining κ = 1−k1−h
(
C
e)1−ρ
= N
1+η
and noting that ct = yt, we can write welfare
W0 as
W0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ct − hXt)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
(Nt+i)
1+η − 1
1 + η
= −1
2
κE0
∞∑
0
βt
[
1− h
1− kρ(c
e
t )
2 + η(yt − at)2 + σvar(pi)
]
+ tip+ o[2].
Or following Woodford (2003)
L0 = −W0 = 1
2
κ
∞∑
0
βt
[
1− h
1− kρ(c
e
t )
2 + η(yt − at)2 + σ
κ
pi2t
]
+ tip+ o[2]
where κ = (1 − α)(1 − αβ)/α is the slope of the Phillips curve. One can write
the unconditional period loss as
E(L) =
[
1− h
1− kρvar(c
e) + ηvar(y′)2 +
σ
κ
var(pi)
]
where y′t = yt − at , with the final two terms identical to the ones that would
arise in model without habits.
We finally observe, that if we define the stochastic discount factor as
Mt+1 = β (Ct+1 − hXt+1)
−ρ
(Ct − hXt)−ρ
= β
(
Cet+1
Cet
)−ρ
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and, hence, vart(mt+1) = vart(ρ(c
e
t+1)) = ρ
2vart(c
e
t+1), then the unconditional
loss function −E(W0) can be written as
1
2
κ
∞∑
0
[
1− h
1− kρ
−1σ2m + ησ
2
y′ +
σ
κ
σ2pi
]
.
Appendix A.2. Economic Efficiency
As shown in DPZ, if a benevolent social planner were to include the economy-
wide habit level (Xt) within her choice variables, then the first order condition
with respect to consumption would be given by
(C∗t − hX∗t )−ρ − Λ∗t − β(1− φ)EtΛxt+1 = 0 (A.1)
where Λxt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier on the equation specifying the evolution
of habits (1). Moreover, the first order condition with respect to Xt would be
−h (C∗t − hX∗t )−ρ + Λxt − βφEtΛxt+1 = 0. (A.2)
If we further assumed perfectly flexible prices and no monopoly power, then the
labour-leisure decision would simplify to
(C∗t )
η = Λ∗tA
η
η+1
t . (A.3)
Because in equilibrium Ct = Xt = Yt, therefore the equations above can be used
to characterise the efficient allocation of output. Specifically, in the special case
of φ = 0, efficiency implies
C∗ηt = A
η/(η+1)
t
[
(C∗t − hX∗t )−ρ − βhEt
(
C∗t+1 − hX∗t+1
)−ρ]
. (A.4)
We now investigate if and how this allocation can be achieved. Let’s assume
that the central bank targets inflation and fully stabilises prices. In this case the
competitive equilibrium, would imply
σθN
σ − 1C
η
t = A
η/(η+1)
t (Ct − hXt)−ρ . (A.5)
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But if we additionally posited a consumption tax Tt, which would enter house-
holds’ budget constraints as
TtPtCt (a) + VtBt (a)−WtNt (a)−Bt−1 (a)−Qt = 0
then competitive equilibrium would imply the following first order condition with
respect to consumption
(Ct − hXt)−ρ = TtΛt (A.6)
and a labour-leisure indifference condition of the form
σθN
σ − 1C
η
t = A
η/(η+1)
t
(Ct − hXt)−ρ
Tt
. (A.7)
If the monetary authority stabilised the price level (ensuring pi = 0) then the
optimal level of the fiscal instrument Tt would equal
Tt =
σ − 1
σ
(Ct − hXt)−ρ
(Ct − hXt)−ρ − βhEt (Ct+1 − hXt+1)−ρ
(A.8)
=
σ − 1
σ
1
1− hβM˜t
. (A.9)
Under this tax rule, the competitive equilibrium would coincide with the social
planners one. It follows directly, that in the steady state we would have
T =
(
1
1− hβ
)
/
(
σ
σ − 1
)
(A.10)
so the decision on either taxing or subsidising consumption would depend on
whether the habit externality (numerator) exceeds the monopolistic distortion
(denominator).
33
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1169 Mirabelle Muûls Exporters, Importers and Credit Constraints 
1168 Thomas Sampson Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Technology 
Diffusion and Learning On-the-job 
1167 Jérôme Adda Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smoking 
Intensity: Reply 
1166 Jonathan Wadsworth Musn't Grumble. Immigration, Health and 
Health Service Use in the UK and Germany 
1165 Nattavudh Powdthavee 
James Vernoit 
The Transferable Scars: A Longitudinal 
Evidence of Psychological Impact of Past 
Parental Unemployment on Adolescents in 
the United Kingdom 
1164 Natalie Chen 
Dennis Novy 
On the Measurement of Trade Costs: Direct 
vs. Indirect Approaches to Quantifying 
Standards and Technical Regulations 
1163 Jörn-Stephan Pischke 
Hannes Schwandt 
A Cautionary Note on Using Industry 
Affiliation to Predict Income 
1162 Cletus C. Coughlin 
Dennis Novy 
Is the International Border Effect Larger than 
the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from 
U.S. Trade 
1161 Gianluca Benigno 
Luca Fornaro 
Reserve Accumulation, Growth and Financial 
Crises 
1160 Gianluca Benigno 
Huigang Chen 
Christopher Otrok 
Alessandro Rebucci 
Eric R. Young 
Capital Controls or Exchange Rate Policy? A 
Pecuniary Externality Perspective 
1159 Paul Dolan 
Georgios Kavetsos 
Happy Talk: Mode of Administration Effects 
on Subjective Well-Being 
1158 Alan Manning Steady-State Equilibrium in a Model of 
Short-Term Wage-Posting 
1157 Joan Costa-Font 
Mireia Jofre-Bonet 
Steven T. Yen 
Not all Incentives Wash out the Warm Glow: 
The Case of Blood Donation Revisited  
1156 Christian Siegel Female Employment and Fertility - The 
Effects of Rising Female Wages 
1155 Albrecht Ritschl The German Transfer Problem, 1920-1933: A 
Sovereign Debt Perspective 
1154 Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt 
Stephen J. Redding 
Daniel M. Sturm 
Nikolaus Wolf 
The Economics of Density: Evidence from 
the Berlin Wall 
1153 Nattavudh Powdthavee 
Yohanes E. Riyanto 
Why Do People Pay for Useless Advice? 
1152 Thomas Sampson Selection into Trade and Wage Inequality 
1151 Tim Barmby 
Alex Bryson 
Barbara Eberth 
Human Capital, Matching and Job 
Satisfaction 
1150 Ralf Martin 
Mirabelle Muûls 
Laure de Preux 
Ulrich J. Wagner 
Industry Compensation Under Relocation 
Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
1149 Albrecht Ritschl Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: the 
Great Depression in Germany 
1148 Alex Bryson 
John Forth 
Minghai Zhou 
The CEO Labour Market in China’s Public 
Listed Companies 
1147 Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
Giovanni Peri 
Greg C. Wright 
Immigration, Offshoring and American Jobs 
1146 Thierry Mayer 
Marc J. Melitz 
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
Market Size, Competition, and the Product 
Mix of Exporters 
1145 Oriana Bandiera 
Luigi Guiso 
Andrea Prat 
Raffaella Sadun 
What do CEOs Do? 
1144 Oriana Bandiera 
Luigi Guiso 
Andrea Prat 
Raffaella Sadun 
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives 
1143 Michael Boehm 
Martin Watzinger 
The Allocation of Talent over the Business 
Cycle and its Effect on Sectoral Productivity 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673 Fax 020 7955 7595 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
